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IS ECONOMIC GROWTH CRIMINOGENIC FOR FIRMS IN 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Several studies have explored the relationship between economy level crime rates or individual 
level crime and economic growth. However, few studies have examined the relationship between 
economic growth and crime against firms which is an important issue especially for developing 
economies. Using data for about 12,000 firms in 27 developing countries we find that economic 
growth has a negative effect on crime. We also find that several macro-economic factors can 
weaken or strengthen the relationship between crime and economic growth. The results are 
robust to various sensitivity checks. 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Several studies have explored the relationship between crime and economic growth. In general 
economic growth increases job market opportunities, consequently raising the opportunity cost 
of engaging in illegitimate activities (Becker, 1968). Furthermore economic growth may increase 
tax revenues resulting in higher government budgets for crime prevention (Cook, 2010; Levitt, 
2004). Both mechanisms propose an inverse relationship between economic growth and crime. 
However, economic growth also serves as an indicator of increasing prosperity and thus the 
effect on crime may depend on the level of risk aversion (Ehrlich, 1973). Increasing prosperity 
may encourage crime-prone behavior such as individuals leaving their houses more often, 
increasing alcohol consumption, or owning more cars. Finally legal institutions, being typically 
slow to adapt, may find it difficult to deal with rapid economic growth and thus providing more 
leeway for criminals to escape punishment, and thus reducing the costs of engaging in 
illegitimate activities. In general, empirical findings have indicated a negative relationship 
between economic growth and crime (Fajnzylber et al, 2002; Bourguignon, 1999; Dutta, 2009). 
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Most of the literature mentioned above concerns overall crime rates in an economy, or crime 
against households. A natural extension of this literature would be to examine the link between 
economic growth and crime against firms since overall crime rate results do not give any 
indication of how the results apply only to firms. Given the importance of private firms in aiding 
development in less developed economies, it is important to examine how the relationship 
between economic growth and crime fairs at the firm level. A few mechanisms translate well 
with regards to crime against firms. Economic growth resulting in increasing economic 
opportunities of individuals makes firms less susceptible to theft, and rising government 
spending on crime may complement a firm’s security measures. However, in terms of risk prone 
behavior induced by economic growth, it is unlikely that alcohol consumption or increasing 
outings by individuals is highly correlated with crime against firms, although there may be 
increases in firm spending on items such as cars across all sizes of firms that may attract criminal 
activity. On the other hand, the rate at which legal institutions adapt to increasing economic 
growth will determine the level of crime against firms. 
 
There is very limited research done on crime against firms. Previous studies have found that 
firms have higher rates of victimization than households. About 24% of retailers and 
manufacturers were burgled in 1993 in contrast to 5.6% of households in Britain (Hopkins, 
2002).  For Latin American countries, large firms experience more crime than small firms, 
although small firms face a larger burden of crime (Amin, 2009). In Africa, ownership of 
informal firms matter, with firms owned by immigrants being more susceptible to a crime than 
native owned firms.  
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The relationship between economic growth and crime against firms is an important macro-micro 
link for developing economies. As far as we know, this is the first study to explore the 
relationship between the burden of crime against firms, as measured by losses due to crime as a 
% of sales, and economic growth. Given the data limitation, it is impossible to comprehensively 
identify a causal link. Thus the goal of this study is to quantify the correlation between economic 
growth and crime against firms, and then explore this relationship further in terms of several 
socio-economic and firm characteristics.  
 
In order to examine the relationship between growth and crime, we use a unique firm level 
dataset with about 12,000 firms in 27 developing countries maintained by the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Analysis unit (Enterprise Surveys). We find that an increase in real GDP per capita 
growth by 1 standard deviation results in a 0.09 standard deviation reduction in the losses due to 
crime. We find that female ownership and management strengthens the relationship between 
economic growth and losses due to crime. While a large police force, good governance, and 
greater voter turnout in elections are good substitutes for economic growth in the context of 
reducing losses due to crime. We use % of land in the tropics, and malaria risk index as 
instruments and find that the results are retained, if not magnified. The results are also robust to 
various sensitivity checks. 
 
Section 2 describes the data, section 3 provides the estimation and results, and sections 4, 5, and 
6 provide instrumental variable estimations, robustness checks, and conclusions respectively. 
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2 Data and Main Variables 
The data for firm level variables are collected by the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. The 
Enterprise Surveys use standard survey instruments to collect firm-level data on a country's 
business environment from business owners and top managers. The surveys cover a broad range 
of topics including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, labor, 
obstacles to growth and performance measures. The survey is designed to be representative of a 
country’s private non-agricultural economy and only registered firms with at least five 
employees are included in the sample. The data consists of a random sample of 12,000 firms 
across 27 developing countries in different regions stratified by firm size, location, and sector.  
The survey year ranges between 2007 and 2009. Details of countries in the sample and their 
respective survey years can be found in the first column of table A2 in the appendix. Data source 
and description of the variable can be found in table A1, with summary statistics in table A2. 
 
2.1 Dependent variable 
The main dependent variable utilized is losses due to crime as a percentage of annual sales. This 
variable is derived from the survey question: “In fiscal year [insert fiscal year], what are the 
estimated losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson that occurred on establishment’s 
premises calculated as a percent of annual sales or the total annual value of the losses?” 
For total values of crime, the percentage over sales is calculated. Crime losses as a % of sale 
capture the intensity of crime. We make no distinction between a firm that has experienced no 
crime and a firm that has experienced crime but incurred no losses. Both firms get a zero value 
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for the dependent variable. The variable averages 0.72% in the sample with a standard deviation 
of 3.9%.  Using country averages across all firms, Azerbaijan has the lowest amount of crime 
losses at 0.20% of sales, while El Salvador has the highest with 1.73%.  
 
We also include an estimation where the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not a firm has experienced crime in the last fiscal year. The survey question is 
phrased as follows: “In fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], has this establishment 
experienced losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson?”  This estimation elucidates 
the relationship between economic growth and the incidence of crime as opposed to the burden 
of crime. 
 
2.2 Explanatory variable 
The main variable of interest is real GDP per capita growth rate which is available for the years 
the firm surveys were undertaken.  The sample mean for the rate of economic growth is 2.66% 
while a standard deviation of 4.2%. Belarus and Romania are the fastest growing economies in 
the sample with growth rates of 10.2% and 9.6% respectively. The country average crime losses 
and economic growth rates are presented in table A4 for each country in the appendix.  
 
2. 3 Other explanatory variables 
We control for several firm level and country level variables. The degree of crime a firm faces 
may depend on its size, the sector it belongs to, and its locale. We control for firm size using 
dummies for small and medium firms. A small firm is defined as a firm with less than 20 
employees, while a medium firm has workers between 20 and 99. We also have a dummy for 
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manufacturing firms. A priori it is not clear whether a manufacturing firm should have higher 
crime losses with respect to other sectors. We also include a city size dummy which takes the 
value of 1 if the city has a population of 250,000 of greater, or is a capital city, and 0 otherwise. 
We also include a dummy for whether a firm has at least one female owner. All these variables 
are from the Enterprise Survey’s data set. 
 
At the country level we control for the number of police per 100,000 of population. The variable 
is obtained from United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems. The variable is typically lagged by 1 year, however due to data constraints, for some 
countries the lag is not exactly one year previous, but a few years before in certain cases. The 
specific details of the number of lags are available in table A3 in the appendix. We also control 
Real GNI per capita and the country wide Gini index given their prominence in the literature. For 
cases where data for the exact date is unavailable, we use data for the closest date available. The 
exact year of data used for GNI per capita and the Gini index are presented in table A3 in the 
appendix. We finally control for country size using the total population of the country. These 
data are available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  Data source and 
description of the variable can be found in table A1, with summary statistics in table A2. 
 
3. Estimation 
We estimate following equation using OLS for crime losses, and Tobit estimation for crime 
experience. 
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Where crime is the losses due to crime as a % of sales of a dummy representing whether a firm 
experienced crime in the last fiscal year, GDPgr is the real GDP per capita growth rate, 
Policelag is the lagged number of police per 100,000 population, Fem is a dummy representing 
female ownership, GNIcap is the real GNI per capita, GINI is the Gini coefficient, Population is 
the total population of the economy, Small  and Medium are firm size dummies, LargeCity is a 
dummy for cities with population of 250,000 and greater, or capital cities, and finally Manf is a 
dummy for manufacturing firms.  
 
All estimates are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. In the later sections we 
add additional variables and interact them with the variable of interest to elucidate several 
relationships. The usual econometric issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias are of a 
concern in the estimation. Reverse causality is an issue given that higher crime can lead to 
slower economic growth. We also have the issue of omitted variable bias as economic growth 
may be correlated with several factors. Both issues are challenging given data limitations. We 
address this by using various checks as presented in the robustness section including instruments. 
 
3.1 Base Regression Results 
All magnitudes discussed in the text are presented in standard deviation units, unless indicated. 
The figures shown in the tables are in nominal units, not standard deviation units. The base 
results are presented in table 1. Column1 indicates that firms in faster growing economies are 
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less likely to experience crime. Consistently, column 2 shows that an increase in GDP per capita 
growth by 1 standard deviation results in a 0.09 reduction in the standard deviation units of 
losses due to crime. Both results are significant at 1%. The sign and significance of these results 
are unchanged when the estimation is done without any controls. The reduction in crime losses 
when the controls are excluded from the estimation is 0.055, significant at 1%. These results 
indicate that economic growth may be a deterrent for crime against firms. One reason could be 
that economic growth increases the opportunity cost of criminal activities leading to less crime. 
This is consistent with studies for individual level crime (Bourguignon, 1999; Fajnzylber et al., 
2002).  
 
A few other results stand out. Firms with female owners are both more likely to experience 
crime, and also face a higher percentage of losses due to crime over sales. A couple of results 
retain significance but switch signs when comparing the impact on likelihood of experiencing 
crime (incidence of crime) and the losses due to crime (burden of crime). GNI per capita seems 
to increase the likelihood of experiencing crime while reducing the losses due to crime. That is, 
with higher income, crime against firms becomes more widespread but also more petty. Income 
per capita has generally shown non robust results with regards to individual level crime in the 
literature (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Soares, 2004)1. Additionally, small and medium firms are less 
likely to experience crime than large firms, but face higher losses due to crime, which has been 
also found in previous studies (Amin, 2009). The size of the country in terms of population has a 
                                                 
1 Due to the lack of continuous data for GNI per capita for some countries, we use the GDP growth rate instead of 
the GNI growth rate as our indicator for economic growth. This is typical in the literature (Fajnzylber et al, 2002). 
The results for female ownership are retained if we use the level of GDP per capita instead of GNI per capita. 
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positive effect on losses due to crime, but no effect on the incidence of crime. Thus, in larger 
economies, firms have higher losses due to crime.  
 
We now consider how several country and firm-level factors may influence the relationship 
between economic growth and the burden of crime on firms. Economic growth may not only 
represent labor market opportunities, but may also capture the quality of legal and public 
institutions (Lederman et al., 2002). Thus we examine the strength of the relationship between 
economic growth and crime and how this relationship depends on factors such as police, female 
ownership and management, governance and voter turnouts in elections. The relationship 
between police, governance and crime have been explored in the literature, and thus we expect 
the effect of economic growth may be conditional these factors. We also use voter turnout as a 
proxy for social organization, and thus it would be interesting to see if the effect of economic 
growth is strengthened by social organization, or weakened by its presence. Finally, given the 
robust positive relationship between female ownership and management and crime, which is 
consistent with female headed households and crime, we examine whether economic growth 
weakens of strengthens this relationship. We use the estimation results in table 1, column 2 as the 
base as there is a more straightforward interpretation with regards to the magnitude of the effects 
of interaction variables. Both the Logit and OLS estimations provide qualitatively similar results 
for economic growth 
 
3.2 Number of Police 
The interaction term between number of police and economic growth is positive and significant 
at 5%. The overall effect of economic growth on crime losses is still negative at the sample mean 
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number of police after interacting economic growth with police. However, looking at the 
extremes of the sample, economic growth has no significant effect on crime losses at the sample 
maximum number of police, but has a large and significant negative effect at the sample 
minimum number of police. The magnitudes are presented in column 1 of table 2. The effect of 
increasing economic growth by 1 standard deviation results in a 0.008 standard deviation 
reduction in crime losses at the sample mean number of police, and 0.149 standard deviation 
units at the lowest number of police in the sample, both results significant at 1%. The number of 
police turning point, after which the effect of economic growth on crime losses is insignificant, 
in the sample is 425 per 100,000 of population, which is at the 83 percentile of the sample. The 
implication of these results may indicate that a larger police force may be a substitute for the 
economic growth when it comes to reducing crime against firms.  
 
3.3 Female Ownership and Management 
The interaction term between female ownership and management and economic growth is 
positive and significant at 5%. Economic growth reduces crime losses whether or not a firm has 
a female or male owner, but the magnitude of the effect is larger if the firm has a female owner, 
or both a female manager and female owners as shown in columns 2 and 3 of table 2. The results 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in economic growth results in a 0.102 standard 
deviation reduction in the dependent variable for female owned firms, in contrast to 0.074 
standard deviation reduction for firms that do not have a female owner. The magnitude is even 
greater for firms with both a female owner and female manager at 0.139 in contrast to 0.081 for 
firms that have all male owners and managers.  An interpretation of this result is that economic 
growth benefits the more vulnerable or less well off in a society.  
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3.4 Governance  
We use ICRG’s Quality of government indicator as a measure of governance. The interaction 
term between Quality of Government and Economic growth is positive and significant at 10%. 
Economic growth has a negative and significant relationship with crime losses at the sample 
mean of the governance indicator. However, this relationship turns insignificant at the sample 
maximum of the governance indicator. At the sample minimum level of governance, the effect of 
economic growth increases in magnitude while retaining significance, when compared to the 
mean level of governance. In column 1 of table 3, we present the magnitudes at the bottom. A 
one standard deviation increase in economic growth results in an approximately 0.095 and 0.144 
standard deviation reduction in crime losses for the sample mean and minimum respectively. 
One interpretation is that better governance is a substitute for the crime-reducing effect of 
economic growth. 
 
3.5 Voter Turnout  
Social disorganization theory indicates that factors that diminish the effectiveness of informal 
social controls increase criminal activity (Kelly, 2000). Here we consider one indicator of social 
disorganization – voter turnout in elections. The interaction term between voter turnout and 
economic growth is positive and significant at 1%. At the mean level of voter turnout, an 
increase in economic growth is significant after interacting voter turnout with economic growth. 
However, this relationship loses significant at the sample minimum of voter turnout, but actually 
gains magnitude and retains significance at the sample maximum of voter turnout. The bottom of 
column 2 of table 3 presents the magnitudes of the effects. A one standard deviation increase in 
economic growth results in a 0.073 standard deviation reduction in crime losses at the sample 
13 
 
mean level of voter turnout and a 0.165 standard deviation reduction in crime at the maximum 
level of voter turnout, both results significant at 1%.  The turning point where the effect of an 
increase in the economic growth ceases to be significant is a voter turnout above 0.8, which is at 
the 85th percentile of the firm sample. This result indicates that a higher voter turnout, possibly 
indicating greater social organization, is a substitute for economic growth with regards to crime 
reduction. 
 
Two major concerns about the estimation results are that the relationship between economic 
growth and losses due to crime are reverse causality and omitted variable bias.  Essentially, an 
increase in losses due to crime can deter economic growth. Similarly, economic growth may be 
capturing something else such as institutions that are not included in the estimations. We 
mitigate this possibility by using instruments and subjecting the base estimates to several 
robustness checks. 
 
4. Instrumental Variables 
We use two instruments for economic growth: the % of land in tropics for each country, and 
malaria risk index, which is the proportion of each country’s population that live with risk of 
malaria transmission in 1994 developed by Sachs and Gallup (2004). Both these variables have 
been found to be an important determinant of economic growth (Sachs et al, 1998).   We report 
the results in table 4. The first stage estimation results presented in column 2 show that while % 
of land in tropics is significant, malaria ecology is not. We include the latter variable in order to 
pass the test of overidentifying restrictions. The overall results are retained without the malaria 
risk instrument. The second stage estimation results are presented in column 1 of table 4. The 
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coefficient of real GDP per capita growth using instrumental variables estimation method retains 
the sign and significance of the base estimations. The magnitude increases slightly from -0.08 in 
the base estimations to -0.12 in the estimations using the instrumental variables. As indicated in 
the bottom of table 4, the Sargen-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is not rejected for all 
conventional levels of significance. Thus we cannot reject the null that all the instruments are 
valid. We also reject that the estimation is underidentified at 5% level of significance.   
 
5. Robustness 
We check for the robustness in terms of model specification. Several studies have shown that 
demographics and human capital (Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002; Kelly, 2000; Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2004), corruption (Gaviria, 2002), fractionalization (Fajnzylber et al, 2000), trade 
(Ghosh et al., 2011), prison population (Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002; levitt, 2004), and 
government spending (Naidoo, 2006) are factors that influence crime. We add sets of variables 
that proxy for the aforementioned factors and present the results in table A5. We also include 
firm level variables such as total employees and security costs as a % of total sales and check if 
they affect our estimation of interest. We also control for inflation, using it as an indicator of 
macroeconomic stability. As shown in table A5, including these sets of variables do not improve 
the goodness of fit, the explanatory power of the model, or reduce the significance of the variable 
of interest. 
  
We also worry that extreme observations in the sample may be driving the results. Thus we omit 
the top 1%, bottom 1 %, and top and bottom 1% observations of losses due to crime as well 
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economic growth, to see if our results are retained. As indicated in table A6, the significance of 
our results is unaffected. 
 
Finally, we worry that our results may be dominated by certain countries. Thus we drop one 
country at a go from the sample and see if the coefficient of economic growth retains the signs 
and significance. As indicated by figure A1, the results are not dominated by any particular 
country in the sample as we retain the sign and significance at 5%. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between economic growth 
and crime against firms, a fairly under-researched area. The paper finds a negative relationship 
between firm losses due to crime and economic growth. Expressed in terms of standard 
deviations, we find that an increase in real GDP per capita growth by 1 standard deviation results 
in a 0.09 standard deviation reduction in the losses due to crime over total sales. The suggested 
mechanism for this effect is that economic growth increases opportunities elsewhere and thus 
increasing the opportunity cost of crime. We find that economic growth is more effective in 
reducing crime loses for firms with female owners and managers. 
 
Possible ways to extend this paper would be to check if the results hold for developed economies 
as well. It would also be interesting to formally explore various channels through which 
economic growth affects crime. Finally, estimations with some time variation in the data would 
be able to test some of the relationships presented in this paper more rigorously.  
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TABLE 1: GDP GROWTH AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS  
 
Logit:
Experienced Crime 
(marginal effects) 
OLS: % of  Losses Due to Crime Over 
Sales 
 1 2 
 
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.0941*** 
 
-0.0808*** 
[0.0226] [0.0208] 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0008 -0.0011* 
[0.0009] [0.0005] 
Firm with Female Owner 
 
0.1357** 0.1181* 
[0.0621]
 
[0.0632] 
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
 
0.0040** -0.0058*** 
[0.0018] [0.0012] 
GINI  
 
 
-0.0023 -0.0065 
[0.0121] [0.0113] 
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
-0.004 0.0034* 
[0.0035] [0.0017] 
Small firms 
 
 
-0.8113*** 0.4023*** 
[0.1138] [0.0940] 
Medium firms 
 
 
-0.3551*** 0.1664** 
[0.0820] [0.0658] 
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0157 0.0331 
[0.0657] [0.0953] 
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.6394*** -0.2238** 
[0.0741] [0.0813] 
Number of Countries 27 27 
Number of Observations 12801 12274 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 2: GDP GROWTH AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES) 
 
 Police lagged x GDP growth 
GDP Growth x 
Female Owner  
GDP Growth x 
Female Owner & 
Manager 
 1 2 3
 
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.1679*** -0.0695*** -0.0763*** 
[0.0471] [0.0219] [0.0261]
Real GDP per Capita Growth x lagged Police 
 
0.0003** 
[0.0001] 
Real GDP per Capita Growth x Female 
Owner 
 
-0.0260*
[0.0149]
Real GDP per Capita Growth x firm with 
female owner and manager 
 
-0.0554**
[0.0259]
Firm with female owner and manager 
 
0.4054**
[0.1587]
Police per 100,000 persons  
 
 
-0.0020** -0.0010* -0.0011*
[0.0009] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Firm with Female Owner 
 
 
0.1078* 0.1886**
[0.0630] [0.0851]
Real GNI per capita (in 100s)
 
 
-0.0061*** -0.0058*** -0.0056***
[0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0066 -0.0062 -0.008
[0.0114] [0.0113] [0.0129]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0025 0.0034* 0.0034**
[0.0019] [0.0018] [0.0016]
Small firms 
 
 
0.3979*** 0.3945*** 0.3511***
[0.0937] [0.0950] [0.0977]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1654** 0.1609** 0.1336*
[0.0654] [0.0650] [0.0758]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0454 0.0321 0.0546
[0.0944] [0.0951] [0.0903]
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2312*** -0.2240** -0.2297**
[0.0815] [0.0810] [0.0885]
Number of Countries 27 27 27
Number of Observations 12274 12274 12449
Effect of 1 std dev increase in Economic 
Growth: 
Change in the standard deviation of the 
Dependent Variable. 
    
Using Mean -0.008***
18 
 
Using Min -0.149***
Using Max 0.002
Interacted Dummy =0 -0.074*** -0.081***
Interacted Dummy =1 -0.102*** -0.139***
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 3: GDP GROWTH AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES) 
 GDP Growth x Quality of Government 
GDP Growth x Voter Turnout
 1 2 
 
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
-0.2226*** 
 
-0.3078*** 
[0.0621]
 
[0.0793] 
Real GDP per Capita Growth  x Quality of 
Government 
 
0.2570*  
[0.1262]  
Quality of Government 
 
-1.9895***  
[0.6779]  
GDP per Capita Growth 
 x Voter Turnout 
 
0.3340***
[0.1174] 
Voter Turnout 
 
-1.5371**
[0.6045] 
Police per 100,000 persons  
 
 
-0.0018*** -0.0011* 
[0.0005] [0.0005] 
Firm with Female Owner 
 
 
0.1139* 0.1130* 
[0.0643] [0.0646] 
Real GNI per capita (in 100s) 
 
 
-0.0030* -0.0043***
[0.0015] [0.0014] 
GINI  
 
 
-0.0220* -0.001 
[0.0118] [0.0099] 
Population in Millions, Total
 
 
0.0032** 0.0037** 
[0.0014] [0.0017] 
Small firms 
 
 
0.4144*** 0.4094***
[0.1036] [0.0962] 
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1806** 0.1728** 
[0.0673] [0.0674] 
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0455 0.0392 
[0.1057] [0.0973] 
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2211** -0.2141**
[0.0952] [0.0836] 
Number of Countries 24 27 
Number of Observations 11242 12274 
Effect of 1 std dev increase in Economic 
Growth: 
Change in the standard deviation of the 
Dependent Variable.   
Using Mean -0.095*** -0.073***
Using Min -0.144*** -0.165***
Using Max -0.021 -0.010 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 4: GDP GROWTH AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS – INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
 
% of  Losses Due to Crime 
Over Sales 
IV Estimates 
Second Stage Results 
Real GDP per capita Growth
First Stage Results 
 
 1
 
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.1212*** 
[0.0351]
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0012** -0.0072
[0.0006] [0.0052]
Firm with Female Owner 
 
0.1097* -0.1129
[0.0602]
 
[0.1782]
 
Malaria Ecology Index  
 
-1.3047
[1.8650]
 
% of land in the Tropics  -3.6070***
[1.0278]
 
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
 
-0.0076*** -0.0590***
[0.0017] [0.0191]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0231 -0.2658***
[0.0152] [0.0761]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0043*** 0.0364**
[0.0015] [0.0169]
Small firms 
 
 
0.4118*** 0.1307
[0.0942] [0.1110]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1721*** 0.0650
[0.0656] [0.0836]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.03 -0.0108
[0.0976] [0.2656]
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2224*** 0.0783
[0.0793] [0.1045]
Number of Countries 27 27
Number of Observations 12274 12274
Instruments Malaria Ecology Index, % of 
land in the Tropics 
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic) P-
value: 0.0233 
Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) 
p-value: 0.1113 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Losses Due to Crime (% of 
sales) 
Response  to the Question:
“In fiscal year [insert fiscal year], what are the 
estimated losses as a result of theft, robbery, 
vandalism or arson that occurred on 
establishment’s premises calculated as a percent of 
annual sales or the total annual value of the 
losses?” 
For actual values, % of sales was calculated. 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Experienced Crime 
Response to the Question:
“In fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], has 
this establishment experienced losses as a result of 
theft, robbery, vandalism or arson?” 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Real GDP per Capita Growth Real GDP per Capita Growth Rate, constant 2000 USD 
Word Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Bank 
Police per 100,000 persons 
lagged 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged. Due to data 
constraints, for some countries the lag is not 
exactly lagged by year. Specifics of all lag years can 
be found in the appendix. 
United Nations Survey on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems 
Firm with Female Owner Yes Response to Question:"Are any of the owners female?" 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Female Owner and Manager 
Yes Response to Questions:
“Is the Top Manager female?” and "Are any of the 
owners female?" 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Real GNI per capita (in 100s)  GNI per Capita, Constant 2000 USD Word Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
GINI Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
WDI, World Bank, Development Research 
Group 
Population, Total in millions  Total Population Word Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
Small firms Dummy is 1 if firm is small (<20) Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Medium firms Dummy is 1 if firm is medium (20-99) Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Large City or Capital Dummy is 1 if city is either the capital or has more than 250,000 population 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Manufacturing Dummy is 1 for manufacturing firms Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Quality of Government 
 Mean value of the ICRG governance variables 
“Corruption”, “Law and Order”, and 
“Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled 0-1. Higher values 
indicate better quality of government. 1990-2007 
average used. 
International Country Risk Guide – The 
PRS Group 
Voter Turnout 
Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as 
the total number of votes cast divided by the 
number of registered voters. 
IDEA: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm 
 
Polity 2 
Index of Democracy (Polity 2). Score between -10 
and 10 that indicate how democratic a country. 
Values increase with greater democracy. 1990-
2007 average used. 
 
Polity IV, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/poli
ty4.htm 
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Years of Schooling 
Average Years of Schooling of Population over 
15. 1990-2007 average used. 1990-2007 average 
used. 
Barro and Lee (2010) 
Corruption 
Corruption Perception Index: 10 point scale 
where higher values indicate less corruption. 1995-
2009 average used. 
Transparency International
ww.transparency.org 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethnic group 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Language Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country do not speak the same 
language 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Religious Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country do not belong to the same 
religion 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Total Employees 
Response to Question:
“At the end of fiscal year [insert last complete 
fiscal year], how many permanent, full-time 
employees did this establishment employ?” 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Security Costs as a % of sales Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Proportion of Female 
Population Population, female (% of total) 
WDI, World Bank 
Percentage of Population in 
Urban Agglomerates 
Population in urban agglomerations of more than 
one million is the percentage of a country's 
population living in metropolitan areas that in 
2000 had a population of more than one million 
people. 
 
WDI, World Bank 
 
Population Density People per sq. km of land area WDI, World Bank  
Proportion of Population 
between 15 and 64 Population ages 15-64 (% of total) 
WDI, World Bank 
Life Expectancy WDI, World Bank 
Government spending on 
Public Order and Safety over 
total Government spending 
Includes spending on police, fire protection 
services, law courts, and prisons 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 
International Monetary Fund 
Inflation WDI, World Bank 
Adult Prison Capacity 
Prisons refer to “Prisons, Penal Institutions or 
Correctional Institutions” which means all public 
and privately financed institutions where persons 
are deprived of their liberty. 
United Nations Survey on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems 
Judges Number of judges per 1000 of population 
United Nations Survey on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems 
Trade Exports plus imports as a % of GDP WDI, World Bank 
Malaria Risk Proportion of each country’s population that live with risk of malaria transmission in 1994 
Sachs and Gallup (2004) 
% of land in Tropics Sachs et. al. (1998) 
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TABLE A2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data Unit 
Losses Due to Crime (% of sales) 0.716 3.942 0.000 100.000 Firm 
Experienced Crime 0.232 0.000 1.000 Firm
GDP per Capita Growth 2.656 4.213 -5.529 10.192 Country
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 287.894 108.187 90.110 480.013 Country
Firm with Female Owner 0.419 0.000 1.000 Firm
Female Owner and Manager 0.152 0.000 1.000 Firm
Real GNI per capita (in 100s) 37.345 31.014 2.257 141.816 Country
GINI 39.826 7.768 25.810 52.330 Country
Population, Total in millions 28.615 27.065 1.353 141.816 Country
Small firms 0.369 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Medium firms 0.378 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Large City or Capital 0.627 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Manufacturing 0.537 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Quality of Government 0.525 0.101 0.351 0.791 Country
Voter Turnout 0.718 0.089 0.460 0.893 Country
Polity 2 6.153 3.926 -5.647 10.000 Country
Years of Schooling 8.066 1.816 2.850 11.689 Country
Corruption 
 3.369 0.960 1.982 6.091 Country 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.383 0.173 0.118 0.663 Country
Language Fractionalization 0.372 0.254 0.030 0.836 Country
Total Employees 121.246 478.223 1.000 20843 Firm
Life Expectancy 69.407 7.440 44.966 78.314 Country 
Proportion of Female Population 50.957 1.339 48.750 54.020 Country
Percentage of Population in Urban 
Agglomerates 21.339 10.624 4.406 39.027 
Country
Population Density 88.485 71.842 1.610 290.871 Country
Proportion of Population between 
15 and 64 63.549 5.393 47.959 70.721 
Country
Government Spending on Public 
Order & Safety over Total 
Spending 0.057 0.026 0.015 0.119 
Country
Inflation 9.488 7.816 2.358 50.705 Country
Security Costs as a % of sales 1.514 5.373 0.000 384.615 Firm
Judges per 1000 of Population 13.166 11.808 0.760 47.020 Country
Adult Prison Capacity 41384 50603 1017 160327 Country
Trade as a % of GDP 84.496 36.049 37.354 182.512 Country
Malaria Risk Index 0.259 0.377 0.000 1.000 Country
% of land in tropics 0.370 0.454 0.000 1.000 Country
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TABLE A3: POLICE, GINI, AND GNI PER CAPITA DATA AND SURVEY YEAR 
 
Country Survey Year Police per 100,000 persons 
lagged Year 
GINI GNI per Capita
Argentina 2009 2008 2009 2009
Azerbaijan 2008  2006 2008 2008
Belarus 2007  2004 2007 2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008  2007 2007 2007
Costa Rica 2009  2006 2009 2009
Czech Republic 2008  2007 1996 2008
Ecuador 2009  2006 2009 2009
El Salvador 2009  2006 2007 2009
Estonia 2008  2007 2004 2008
Fyr Macedonia 2008  2006 2008 2005
Hungary 2008  2007 2007 2008
Kazakhstan 2008  2007 2007 2008
Latvia 2008  2007 2008 2008
Lithuania 2008  2007 2008 2008
Moldova 2008  2007 2008 2008
Mongolia 2008  2004 2008 2000
Nepal 2008  2006 2004 2000
Nicaragua 2009  2006 2005 2009
Paraguay 2009  2006 2008 2009
Peru 2009  2004 2009 2009
Philippines 2008  2007 2006 2008
Poland 2008  2007 2008 2008
Romania 2008  2007 2008 2008
Slovak Republic 2008  2007 1996 2008
Slovenia 2008  2007 2004 2008
Turkey 2007  2006 2008 2007
Ukraine 2007 2006 2008 2007
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A4: CRIME AND GROWTH - COUNTRY AVERAGES 
 
Country % of  Losses Due to Crime Over Sales Real GDP per Capita Growth 
Argentina 0.63 -0.13 
Azerbaijan 0.20 9.54 
Belarus 0.72 10.19 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.44 5.57 
Costa Rica 0.54 -2.79 
Czech Republic 0.48 1.58 
Ecuador 1.11 -0.70 
El Salvador 1.73 -4.00 
Estonia 1.69 -4.99 
Fyr Macedonia 0.50 4.76 
Hungary 0.25 1.00 
Kazakhstan 0.60 2.05 
Latvia 0.42 -3.82 
Lithuania 0.43 3.46 
Moldova 0.54 7.97 
Mongolia 0.52 7.67 
Nepal 0.87 4.18 
Nicaragua 1.68 -2.76 
Paraguay 1.54 -5.53 
Peru 0.64 -0.27 
Philippines 1.32 2.27 
Poland 0.45 5.11 
Romania 0.36 9.59 
Slovak Republic 0.64 5.99 
Slovenia 0.26 3.33 
Turkey 0.38 3.36 
Ukraine 0.45 8.55 
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TABLE A5: ROBUSTNESS – ADDED CONTROLS 
Coefficient of Real GDP per Capita Growth Adjusted R Squared 
 
BASE -0.0808*** 
 
0.01 
[0.0208]  
  
Fractionalization 
Ethnic, Language, Religion 
-0.0616** 0.01
[0.0222]  
  
Employees and Security 
Total Employees, Security Costs as 
a % of sales 
-0.0803*** 0.01
[0.0211]  
  
Corruption and Democracy
Corruption (Transparency 
International), Polity 2 Score 
-0.0844*** 0.01
[0.0205]  
  
Population and Demographics 
Proportion of Female Population,  
Population Density, Proportion of 
Population between 15 and 64 
-0.0578** 0.01
[0.0238]  
  
Human Capital 
Life Expectancy, Years of 
Schooling 
-0.0881*** 0.01
[0.0285]  
  
Government Spending and 
Inflation 
Government Spending on Public 
Order & Safety, Inflation 
-0.0586* 0.01
[0.0321]  
  
Judges and Prison Capacity 
Judges per 1000 of Population, 
Adult Prison Capacity 
-0.0743*** 0.01
[0.0243]  
  
Trade 
Trade as a % of GDP 
-0.0741*** 0.01
[0.0204]  
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TABLE A6: ROBUSTNESS – EXTREME OBSERVATION DOMINANCE 
Coefficient of Real GDP per 
Capita Growth 
Dropping Extreme Crime Loss Observations 
Bottom 1% 
 
-0.081*** 
[0.021] 
Top 1% 
 
-0.111*** 
[0.026] 
Top and Bottom 1% 
 
-0.112*** 
[0.027] 
Dropping Extreme Real GDP per Capita Growth Observations  
Bottom 1% 
 
-0.078*** 
[0.021] 
Top 1% 
 
-0.084*** 
[0.025] 
Top and Bottom 1% 
 
-0.082*** 
[0.025] 
 
 
FIGURE A1: COUNTRY DOMINANCE 
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